

Programme

24 November 2010

Public lectures: 19:00 - 21:30

De Doelenzaal, Singel 421

Fenrong Liu - Tsinghua University, China - *Chinese Logic and Philosophy: Reconstruction or Integration*

Rens Bod - Universiteit van Amsterdam - *Towards a World History of the Humanities: The Impact of China*

The

History of Logic in China

25-26 November 2010

Workshop

Universiteit van Amsterdam,
De Doelenzaal, Singel 421, Amsterdam

Convenors:

Johan van Benthem - Universiteit van Amsterdam,
the Netherlands & Stanford University, USA

Jeremy Seligman - University of Auckland, New Zealand
Fenrong Liu - Tsinghua University, China

Speakers: Chris Fraser,
Chien-Shuo Chiu, Karel van der
Leeuw, Thierry Lucas, Jincheng
Zhai, Jer-Shiarn Lee, Christoph
Harbsmeier, Chad Hansen,
Wujing Yang, Fenrong Liu,
Jeremy Seligman, Johan van
Benthem, Paul van Els,
Hsien-Chung Lee, Zhaoshi Zeng,
Yun Xie, Zhongyuan Sun

Registration & Information | www.sciencehistory.asia



The History of Logic in China

Date: 24 – 26 November 2010

Venue: Universiteit van Amsterdam, De Doelenzaal, Singel 421,
Amsterdam (*Main entrance of the University Library: Singel 425*)

Perspective:

Do different cultures embody fundamentally different styles of thinking? An emphasis on rigorous explicit logic has often been considered a hallmark of Western culture, dating back to Greek Antiquity. But things are more complex, and cultures sometimes have surprising similarities beyond their standard images. In fact, logic started independently, roughly around the same time, in Greece, India, and China. What does this tell us about analogies in thinking across human beings and their cultures? How do we or should we perceive it? The aim of this workshop is to get clearer on these issues.

The workshop brings together experts in Chinese logic and Western logic, comparing themes and insights in these two traditions in detail. While focusing on the School of Mohism in the Pre-Qin period, the workshop will also study logical contributions by other schools, for instance, Confucianism. Basic concepts and reasoning patterns will be extensively explored at the workshop, linking up with modern logical notions and theories. We will also discuss how ancient Chinese logic developed, even into the 20th century, and study how this affects current ways of thinking. While the main emphasis of this event is scholarly, it also touches on major scientific and cultural issues today.

Wednesday 24 November 2010

- 19.00 – 19.10 Welcome by **Karel van der Toorn**, President, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- 19.10-20.10 *Chinese Logic and Philosophy: Reconstruction or Integration?*
Fenrong Liu, Tsinghua University, China
- 20.10-21.10 *Towards a World History of the Humanities: The Impact of China*
Rens Bod, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- 21.10-21.30 Discussion

The public lectures are organised in cooperation with



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Thursday 25 November 2010

- SESSION I A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT ANCIENT CHINESE LOGICAL THOUGHT**
- 9.10-9.45 *Distinctions, Judgment, and Reasoning in Classical Chinese Thought*
Chris Fraser, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
- 9.45-10.20 *What is a Good Argument in Mohist Thought?*
Chien-Shuo Chiu, Fu Jen Catholic University, Taiwan
- 10.20-10.40 *Break*
- 10.40-11.15 *Aristotelean and Mohist Conceptions of Logic and Language*
Karel L van der Leeuw, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- 11.15-12.00 Commentary + Discussion
Discussants:
Martin Stokhof, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Meiyun Guo, Southwest University, China and University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- 12.00-13.30 *Lunch*
- SESSION II MOHIST LOGIC: BASIC CONCEPTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES**
- 13.30-14.05 *Basic Concepts of Mohist Logic*
Thierry Lucas, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium
- 14.05-14.40 *A New Explanation on the Reasoning Patterns in Mohist Logic*
Jincheng Zhai, Nankai University, Tianjin, China
- 14.40- 15.20 Commentary + Discussion
Discussants:
Koji Nakatogawa, Hokkaido University, Japan
Frank Veltman, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- 15.20-15.40 *Break*
- SESSION III LOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN OTHER CHINESE TRADITIONS**
- 15.40-16.15 *On Xunzi's Conventional Principle of Instituting Names and Its Deriving Problem*
Jer-Shiarn Lee, Yunlin Science and Technology University, Douliou, Taiwan
- 16.15-16.50 *Some Philosophical Notes On the Guōdiàn 郭店 Manuscript Yǔcóng 語叢*
Christoph Harbsmeier, University of Oslo, Norway
- 16.50-17.00 *Break*
- 17.00-17.40 Commentary + Discussion
Discussants:
Rens Krijgsman, Leiden University, the Netherlands
Gregor Paul, Karlsruhe University, Germany

Friday 26 November 2010

SESSION IV MODERN LOGIC MEETS CHINESE ANCIENT LOGIC

9.10-9.45 *Navigation Logic in China*

Chad Hansen, National University of Singapore, Singapore

9.45-10.20 *Valid Reasoning in Ancient China from the Perspective of Modern Logic*

Wujin Yang, Renmin University, Beijing, China

10.20-10.40 *Break*

10.40-11.15 *Models of Reasoning in Ancient China*

Jeremy Seligman, University of Auckland, New Zealand, **Fenrong Liu**,
Tsinghua University, China and **Johan van Benthem**, University of
Amsterdam, the Netherlands and Stanford University, USA

11.15-12.00 Commentary + Discussion

Discussant:

Floris Roelofsen, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

12.00-13.30 *Lunch*

SESSION V UNDERSTANDING REASONING PROCESSES

13.30-14.05 *The Role of Anecdotes in Chinese Reasoning*

Paul van Els, Leiden University, the Netherlands

14.05-14.40 *An Investigation on the Thought Unit of Persuasive Reasoning in Ancient
China*

Hsien-Chung Lee, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan

14.40-15.20 Commentary + Discussion

Discussant:

Henry Prakken, Utrecht University, the Netherlands

15.20-15.40 *Break*

SESSION VI LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF CHINESE LOGIC

15.40-16.15 *Liang Qichao's Research Paradigm and the Study of History of Logic in China*

Zhaoshi Zeng and **Yun Xie**, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

16.15-16.50 *Research Concerning the "Meta" Investigation of Chinese Logic*

Zhongyuan Sun, Renmin University, Beijing, China

16.50-17.00 *Break*

17.00-17.40 Commentary + *Discussion in Chinese*

Discussant:

Daide Grossi, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Zhisheng Huang, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands

17.40-18.00 *Closing remarks: Weaving New Logic History*

Johan van Benthem, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands and
Stanford University, USA

Wednesday 24 November 2010

Fenrong Liu, *Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China*

Chinese logic and philosophy: Reconstruction or integration?

Do we Chinese think differently from Western people? How different cultures influence our reasoning? If Confucius were alive, could he communicate with Plato? This lecture is an attempt to answer those questions. The talk will start with an old controversy on whether there is 'Chinese logic' or 'Chinese philosophy', a hot issue some 100 years ago, which has returned in force today. I first analyze the general background of the debate from a historical point of view, and relate it to features of Chinese society in the past and today. Then I turn to logic, and focus on the following question: do the Chinese reason differently from Western people? I will argue that we share the intellectual quest of reasoning rationally and logically, which is at the same time the core and basis for cross-cultural communication. In passing, I also show how cultural differences add some intriguing new flavours. Still, history tells us that communication across cultures has been taking place all the time. Different cultures are not static 'identities': they keep integrating, with mutual influences. The case of China and the West is no exception, but rather an illustration of this general pattern.

Fenrong Liu (<http://fenrong.net/>) is an associate professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing, one of the most prestigious universities in China. She received her first Ph.D degree in Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2001 on default reasoning, a topic linking philosophy with Artificial Intelligence. From 2003-2008, she worked at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) at the University of Amsterdam, where she obtained a second Ph.D degree in Science on dynamic logics of preference. Most of her research is aimed at understanding the following issues. How does information change human preference and beliefs? How can we model the similarities and differences between agents, making room for agent diversity in logic? And finally, what is the best way of reading the ancient Chinese logic literature? Are we reasoning across cultures in similar ways, or differently, and if the latter, where is the borderline?

Rens Bod, *Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands*

Towards a World History of the Humanities: The Impact of China

While the historiography of science stems from at least the 19th century, an historical overview of the humanities formed until very recently a conspicuous gap in intellectual history. In his 2010 book "De Vergeten Wetenschappen" ("The Forgotten Sciences"), Rens Bod shows how 'humanists' from China, India, Arabic world, Africa and Europe analyzed their material (language, art, music, literature and the past) and what kind of patterns they found. In the current lecture he will focus on the development of the Chinese humanities, showing that the "analogical" method of argumentation in Chinese logic is hard to find in other humanistic practices, such as historiography (e.g. Sima Qian, Liu Zhiji), philology (Shu Xi, Gu Yanwu), art theory (Xie He, Zhu Jingxuan), music theory (Liu An, Cai Yuanding) and poetics (e.g. Liu Xie, Chen Kui, Hu Yinglin). In these disciplines there is first of all a search for (descriptive or prescriptive) rule-based systems that closely resemble developments in other regions, such as India and Europe. However, it turns out that the search for underlying principles is found in all Chinese humanities, including logic and rhetoric. We will discuss what this means for the old controversy on

whether there exists a "Chinese humanistic practice".

Prof. Dr. Rens Bod (<http://staff.science.uva.nl/~rens/>) is a professor at the ILLC, University of Amsterdam, in the area of language, computation, and cognition. He is a 'profile professor' at the UvA Faculty of Humanities with a particular interest in the broader role of the Humanities. His book "De Vergeten Wetenschappen" ("The Forgotten Sciences") will come out this fall:

http://www.uitgeverijprometheus.nl/index.php?option=com_pac&view=boek_detail&isbn=9789035134850

Thursday 25 November 2010

SESSION I: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT ANCIENT CHINESE LOGICAL THOUGHT

Chris Fraser, *University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong*

Distinctions, Judgement, and Reasoning in Classical Chinese Thought

The paper proposes an account of the classical Chinese view of reasoning and argumentation that grounds it in a semantic theory and epistemology centered around drawing distinctions. Pre-Qin thinkers have a model of reasoning based on a cluster of concepts that includes names (*míng* 名), similarity (*ruò* 若 and *tóng* 同), kinds (*lèi* 類), models (*fǎ* 法), and distinction drawing (*biàn* 辯). Judgment is understood as the attitude of predicating a term of something, or, equivalently, that of distinguishing whether or not something is the kind of thing denoted by that term. Reasoning and argumentation are not explained by appeal to the model of a syllogism or a premises-conclusion argument. Instead, reasoning is the process of considering how some acts of term predication, or distinction drawing, normatively commit one to making further, analogous predications or drawing further, analogous distinctions. Inference is typically understood as the act of predicating a term of something as a consequence of having distinguished that thing as similar to a model for the kind of thing denoted by that term. Inference is thus in effect an act or sequence of acts of pattern recognition. The paper concludes by summarizing the consequences of the proposed account of early Chinese semantic and logical theories for the interpretation of other aspects of pre-Qin thought

Chien-Shuo Chiu, *Fu Jen Catholic University, Taiwan*

What is a Good Argument in Mohist Thought?

This article is about the problem of evaluation of argument in Mohist Thought. The modern research of Mohist logic is influenced by western logic, and our problem will be analyzed under this background. For most researchers of Mohist logic, they hope to absorb the nutrition from western logic, furthermore they want to keep Mohist logic independent of western logic. In this situation, the relation between Mohist logic and western logic become a problem extremely important. The actual result of Mohist logic is the proper development of Mohist thought? Or it originates from western logic. Under this complexity, how to evaluate the argument in Mohist thought becomes a delicate problem. The main goal of this article is to offer a way to understand the relation between western logic and Mohist logic, by expose firstly the meaning of the 'influence' of western logic on Mohist logic, secondly the plurality of argument in Mohist thought, the perspective of process proposed by Shen You Ding, and the roles that logic of analogy and deductive logic play in Mohist logic. after the discussion of this paper, I hope, at least, when we evaluate the argument in Mohist thought afterwards, we won't be perplexed by their relation.

Karel L van der Leeuw, *University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands*

Aristotelean and Mohist Conceptions of Logic and Language

Aristotelean and Mohist logic are both based on a definite, but in both cases very different ontology. This will be elucidated by a comparison of the Aristotelean concept of *genus* and the Mohist concept of *lei*. Traditional translations of the Chinese terms *tong* and *yi* as 'similarity' and 'difference' tend to mask the fundamental difference between both concepts. In connection with this, the purpose of Aristotelean logic is widely different from the Mohist purpose. As I see it, Mohist logic is more a theory of argumentation and thus serves a practical, not a theoretical purpose.²

SESSION II: MOHIST LOGIC: BASIC CONCEPTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES

Thierry Lucas, *Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium*

Basic Concepts of Mohist Logic

The paper will briefly recall the historical and intellectual context of later Mohist Logic and will mainly discuss its basic logical concepts in relation with contemporary logic: disputation; name, object and their relation; proposition; "lei" (class or sort or kind); inference. Other notions such as 'a priori', necessary and sufficient condition, quantification, necessity, time, space, infinity, ... will also be mentioned.

Jincheng Zhai, *Nankai University, Tianjin, China*

A New Explanation on the Reasoning Patterns in Mohist Logic

Mohist logic is one of the paragons of local logical thoughts in ancient China. The reasoning patterns in Mohist Logic includes *Pi*(辟), *Mou*(侔), *Yuan*(援) and *Tui*(推). The study of the reasoning patterns in Mohist Logic is an important issue in both the fields of international Chinese study and the history of Chinese logic, with many relative achievements till now. Some western scholars regarded the Chinese logic as a unique logic based on the non-Indo-European language system, such as Hansen Chad (1983), A. Harbsmeier (1998), A. C. Graham (2003), and Anton Dumitriu (1977), ect. The approach they adopted to explain the reasoning patterns in Mohist logic is mainly under the scope of western logic and philosophy. In China, the majority of scholars' researches followed the inductive and deductive theory in traditional logic. With the relative development in research such as the history of culture, philosophy and science, new progress was made on study of the Chinese logic, for example, Glashoph (2004) and Zhai (2007). Thus, it is necessary and possible to give a new interpretation on the reasoning patterns in Mohist logic.

We believe that the study on the logical thought in the human history should be based on the general character of logic. The character is that the object is demonstration and possesses the property of instrument, form and valid, while reasoning is the expression form of logic. In the development of the cultures of China, Greece and Indian, Chinese logic incarnates the same general character of logic as both Aristotelian logic and Indian logic. Furthermore, the Chinese logic, developed from the Chinese traditional culture, has the independent character of itself. So the interpretation of the meaning of the logic should be based on the Chinese culture and philosophy.

To integrate both the general character of logic and Chinese traditional culture is a new method to explain the reasoning patterns in Mohist logic. The new interpretation will not only give a full comprehension on this local Chinese logic but

² I have refrained from the use of Chinese characters in the text, they would be unnecessary for whom is familiar with Classical Chinese, and useless for those who aren't.

also show the value of Chinese logic in the system of world logic.

Key words: Mohist Logic, Reasoning Patterns, General Character of Logic

SESSION III: LOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN OTHER CHINESE TRADITIONS

Jer-shiarn Lee, *Yunlin Science and Technology University, Douliou, Taiwan*

On Xunzi's Conventional Principle of Instituting Names and Its Deriving Problem

During the Pre-Qin period, except for the School of Names (Mingjia) and the Mohist School (Mojia), the most important figure in the study of the theory of names was Xunzi. Xunzi's major contribution to the theory of names in the Pre-Qin times was to criticize and further develop the Mingjia and Mojias' theory of names as well as to inherit and develop sufficiently Confucius' doctrine of rectifying names.

The purpose of Xunzi's theory of names is to institute names. The principles of instituting names which Xunzi proposed are: 1. The principle of distinguishing similar from different names; 2. The principle of a name being direct, easy and not at odds with the object that it names; 3. The principle of examining objects and determining their number; 4. The principle of convention; and, 5. The principle of instituting names by the king. Among these principles, that of convention is the most important; however, its assessment among scholars is controversial and it is not clear from it whether Xunzi's philosophical position is one of nominalism or realism. If we can not solve these problems mentioned, we might not be able to comprehend properly the meaning and position of Xunzi's theory of names in the intellectual history of Pre-Qin times. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore thoroughly the essence of Xunzi's conventional principle of instituting names in order to comprehend properly Xunzi's theory of names.

Key words: Xunzi · Theory of Names · Convention · Conventionalism · Nominalism · Realism

Christoph Harbsmeier, *University of Oslo, Norway*

Some Philosophical Notes On the Guōdiàn 郭店 Manuscript Yǔcóng 語叢

In this exploratory paper I shall try to argue that *Yǔcóng* 語叢 1 is not at all like the *Yǔcóng* 語叢 chapter of the *Shuìyuàn* 說苑. It does not consist of *yǔ* 語 "speech, talk (as part of dialogue)" and is not really a *cóng* 叢 "congeries" but rather something more like a truncated *jīng* 經 of sophisticated abstract propositions of considerable logical interest. For this truncated *jīng* 經 I try my best to reconstruct a relevant elaborated *shuō* 說 "explanation" for discussion by the many specialists in excavated Chinese literature.

I used to believe that the intellectual style of the dialectical chapters of the *Mò zǐ* 墨, the so-called *Mò jīng* 墨經 were special to the Mohist tradition, a sign of a specifically Mohist rationalism. *Yǔcóng* 語叢 1 shows that non-Mohist conventional thinkers of the Late Warring States period were writing in something of the same spirit of logical analysis. It will be up to specialists in excavated literature to decide to what extent I have been able to make a plausible case for these generalisations. My limited perspective will be that of philologically lean philosophical analysis of the text, mainly as transcribed in Liú Zhào 劉釗 2003 (劉釗: 《郭店楚簡校釋》, 福州: 福建人民出版社, 2003年). In addition I have always consulted Li Líng 李零 2002 with great interest. (李零 《郭店楚簡校讀記》(增訂本), 北京大學出版社 2002年3月). The literature relevant to the Guo1dia4n documents is vast and very hard to keep track

of. Professor 李天虹 Tiānhóng 李天虹 has very kindly compiled a bibliography of relevant material which I have gratefully appended to this article.

Friday 26 November 2010

SESSION IV: MODERN LOGIC MEETS CHINESE ANCIENT LOGIC

Chad Hansen, *National University of Singapore, Singapore*

Navigation Logic in China

This paper advances a comparative hypothesis about the Classical Chinese alternative to “laws of thought.” I start from my earlier conclusion that the Chinese “School of Names” developed semantic, but not logical theories. The crux of my argument concerned the absence of a sentential (propositional) focus. Western thinkers represent *thoughts* as syntactic compositional structures of mental contents with units (ideas) corresponding to words. A traditional Western conception of the role of logic is of *laws of thought* so conceived. We might now express this as laws governing inferential connections linking experience, concepts, and behavior. That input-transformation-output semantic model provides the scaffolding for a comparative hypothesis which explains how insights into Chinese semantics can provide insights into what came to be called *Daoism*. Chinese philosophical disputes pivot around a 道 roads metaphor. Behavior is “walking a road” 行道 and what I have called a discourse dào is analogous to a map. Dé would be an internalized map—an innate or acquired capacity to find ways and follow them. Thinking, either visual or verbal, is moving mentally through a plan—planning or rehearsing some course of action. Laws, besides their *universal* syntactic structure, have necessity. A plausible navigational counterpart is the actual nomic possibility of some being’s executing some dào in real time-space. Those *real* dào possibilities are constituted by the configuration of 實 stuff (including the stuff of the agent’s own talents and abilities). A semantics that picks out and sorts stuff thus enables a discourse dào to function as a map. Words label structures that might block or facilitate our *walking*. The emphasis on context and indexicals reflect the value of a map’s “you are here” label. A map-road metaphor thus helps explain why Daoism might argue that dào is empty or non-being (the space or gaps between solid-stuff that invite our *walking*).

Wujin Yang, *Renmin University, Beijing, China*

Valid Reasoning in Ancient China from the Perspective of Modern Logic

Logic concerns reasoning and argument. To reason is to go from known premises to an unknown conclusion. In ancient China reasoning and argument was called *shuo* (说). The inferring capability of mankind can surmount the bounds of time and space, with the application of “knowing the future from the past and now”. The aim of reasoning and argument is to reveal reasons or causes: “*gu* (reason or cause) is brought out by *shuo*” (以说出故). Ancient China logic mainly stressed to explore the arguments by comparing west logic. Reasoning is valid if it is impossible for the premises all to be true and the conclusion false; that is to say, if premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. In ancient China, Moism also presented a standard of how determined whether a reasoning is correct or not. The issue of validity in reasoning was called “*xiao* (效)”. Correct reasoning was called “*zhongxiao*” (中效) and incorrect reasoning was called “*buzhongxiao*” (不中效). However, the standard of valid reasoning in ancient China logic not only is aimed to formal deduction, but also is aimed to consider induction and analogism, that is to say, all sound reasoning are attributed to valid reasoning, and then the concept of

the valid reasoning becomes more widespread.

Jeremy Seligman, *University of Auckland, New Zealand*, **Fenrong Liu**,
Tsinghua University, China and **Johan van Benthem**, *University of Amsterdam,*
the Netherlands and Stanford University, USA

Models of Reasoning in Ancient China

The aim of this paper is exploratory: to propose a few models of the central concepts of classical Chinese philosophy, with the modest aim of indicating, in rough terms, how the techniques of modern logic may be applied to matters of ancient concern. We do not claim that any of the ideas presented here give a correct or faithful account of their subject matter. They are models, that is all. Some may ultimately prove useful; others will have to be discarded along the way. We hope only to demonstrate the kind of application of modern techniques that we believe to be generally useful.

By 'modern logic' we do not mean the predicate calculus or set theory or any one symbolic system, classical or non-classical. Instead, we draw on the spirit of research in modern logic, especially those parts of logic commonly termed 'philosophical' or 'applied'. That is a spirit of 'anything goes,' in which problems and conundrums are approached on their own terms, without ideological bias towards any one system or set of techniques.

Imagine for a moment that you are given the opportunity of a trip to the ancient state of 齊 *Qí* in a suitably reliable time machine. Your destination is the famous 稷下 *Jìxià* academy. When you arrive, the halls will be full of scholars debating such topics as the importance of 禮 *lǐ* (ritual), how to determine what is 義 *yì* (right), the relationship between 名 *míng* (names) and 實 *shí* (reality), and of course, the nature of 性 *xìng* (human nature). Equipped with the tools of modern logic, you set out to make sense of these debates in the best way you can. One approach would be to start a school of logic, teaching the predicate calculus and set theory, in the hope that once the light of 21st century reason has been shed on the dark corners of the hall, many mysteries and sources of confusion would just evaporate.

This may not be the best strategy.

One immediate problem is that these tools were developed in the 19th and 20th centuries to deal with problems in the philosophy of mathematics. For that, they are very well suited. Of course, they have gone on to find application in a much broader arena. But first and foremost, they are tools for reasoning about mathematical objects, timeless and discrete numbers, whose properties are more-or-less determinate, and about which the largest mystery concerns the treatment of infinity. No matter how much faith one has in the power of logic, the difficulty of showing the application of these techniques to the ancient debates, which are mostly concerned with the time-bound, vague, indeterminate and finite affairs of humankind, must be appreciated.

Our approach will be different. To be sure, an understanding of our techniques depends on the same educational background as other parts of mathematical logic. But we will try to model the subject matter of the ancient debates directly, using only what is needed when it is needed, without presupposing the possibility of a translation or interpretation of the models back into something more standard, even though it is almost certain that such a possibility could eventually be realized.

SESSION V: UNDERSTANDING REASONING PROCESSES

Paul van Els, *Leiden University, the Netherlands*

The Role of Anecdotes in Chinese Reasoning

This presentation outlines a new research project that studies a wealth of ancient Chinese anecdotes. Defining anecdotes as short, freestanding accounts of events in Chinese history – "true" or invented – the project draws on several representative texts from the formative stages of Chinese imperial culture (circa 240-120 BCE), to determine the rhetorical function and cultural significance of anecdotes in early Chinese thought.

The use of anecdotes in China emerged when Confucius and other thinkers criticized rulers, explained canonical scriptures, and competed with rival thinkers through their mastery of anecdotes. Notably, they reinforced their argumentative writings by including collections of anecdotes. As such, whereas in Western philosophy anecdotes play a relatively marginal role, in China they formed an integral part of rhetorical strategies.

In line with the workshop's focus on ancient Chinese logic and argumentation, this presentation details the background, objectives, and methodology of the new research project, and offers a case study of how two particular texts (*Han Ying's Illustration of the Odes* and *Huainanzi*) use anecdotes as a rhetorical strategy to strengthen their argument.

Hsien-Chung Lee, *Department of Philosophy, Soochow University, Taiwan*

An Investigation on the Thought Unit of Persuasive Reasoning in Ancient China

This study intends to investigate persuasive reasoning and its thought units in ancient China, and to point out that the structure of a thought unit included: context construction, context processing, and context integration. Context construction is affected by factors such as the characteristics of objects, argumentation, and the questioning of objects. The methods for context processing include: context extension, context conflict, context reasoning, etc. Context integration involves the coordination between context construction and context processing of a thought unit, as well as the correlation among context construction of thought units. In addition, it is the integration between the context constructed by the expresser and the thinking context of the object. The reasoning relationship among thought units is based on their integration, and its purpose is to complete persuasion. This study identified the characteristics of reasoning in philosophy of pre-Qin philosophy based on the analysis of the structure of thought units.

Keywords: Thinking context, Thought unit, Context construction, Context processing, Context integration, Relatively common

SESSION VI: LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF CHINESE LOGIC

Zhaoshi Zeng and Yun Xie, *Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China*

Liang Qichao's Research Paradigm and the Study of History of Logic in China

In this paper we will investigate, from a historical point of view, a research paradigm in the study of history of logic in China. It is originally created by Liang Qichao and has greatly influenced our study of history of logic in China for the following hundred

years. We firstly reveal its glorious influence through a historical review of our leading scholars' studies on history of logic in China, and then argue that this paradigm itself still needs more serious scrutiny, since it actually imposes into our study of Chinese logic a few presuppositions which are not as reasonable and tenable as before.

Sun Zhongyuan, *Renmin University, Beijing, China*

Research Concerning the "Meta" Investigation of Chinese Logic

This paper works toward future investigations of Chinese logic, for which we take the metatheoretical approach of western logicians as our primary reference. Gong-sun Longzi's Theory of Names and Reality (名实论), Xunzi's Rectification of Names (正名) and the study of naming and argumentation in the Mohist Canons are the main pre-Qin sources concerning the logic of naming and argumentation. This constitutes a first layer of "meta" investigation. Gong-sun Longzi's Theory of Names and Reality and the Mohist Canons brings the logic of the rectification of names to a conclusion. Good examples of "meta" investigation in the pre-Qin period are the argumentation patterns using *tui* 推 in the Mohist Lesser Pick (小取) and the use of *zhi* 止 in the Mohist Canons. The examples of argumentation within various other texts of the Warring States period provide "object" level data for the first layer of "meta" investigation. Then modern scholars have taken this layer as the object of study and constructed, by creative annotation and transformation, as a second layer of "meta" investigation. Such annotations and transformations are necessary to express the original ideas about naming and argumentation in the pre-Qin period. Without them the classical Chinese used by the early scholars is very difficult for modern people to interpret. From these annotated texts, through comprehensive study of ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign logic, we construct a universal logic of humanity, which is the most important original contribution of these early Chinese logicians.

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